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Chairmen Johnson, Ranking Member Xavier Becerra and members 
of the Subcommittee: 
 
Thank you for providing the Association of Administrative Law 
Judges (AALJ) the opportunity to submit this statement.  My name is 
D. Randall Frye.  I am a United States Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ or Judge) assigned to the Social Security Administration (SSA).  
I have been hearing Social Security Disability cases in Charlotte, 
North Carolina for about 15 years.  I have also served as 
Administrative Law Judge for the National Labor Relations Board 
for one and one-half years.  I am currently President of the AALJ, 
which represents the approximately 1400 Administrative Law Judges 
employed at the SSA.  One of the stated purposes of the AALJ is to 
promote and preserve due process hearings in compliance with the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Social Security Act for 
those individuals who seek adjudication of program entitlement 
disputes within the SSA.  It is the longstanding position of the AALJ 
that ensuring full and fair due process de novo hearings brings justice 
to the American people.  The AALJ represents most of the 
approximately 1600 administrative law judges in the entire Federal 
government. 
Some criticism has been recently levied against the world's 
largest adjudicatory system.  However, the concerns raised do not 
present issues that are insurmountable.  In this statement, the AALJ 
proposes changes we believe are necessary to make the federal 
disability administrative judiciary more efficient and effective as well 
as addresses some of the issues raised during the past year.  In 
addition, the AALJ believes the proposed changes, most of which are 
not new, would be cost effective and would well serve the American 
people.  For example, the AALJ has advocated for over a decade that 
our government be represented in cases before Administrative Law 
Judges with the full right to appeal.  We are extremely pleased that 
such a program is now supported by Senator Coburn.1 
 
                                                          
1 Back in Black–Preserving Social Security for Future Generations, U.S. 
Senator Tom Coburn, M.D. (R-OK), July 18, 2011. 
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THE NEED FOR AN INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY 
 
In 1946, the Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) to reform the administrative hearing process and procedures 
in the Federal government and to protect, inter alia, the American 
public by giving ALJs decisional independence.  "Congress intended 
to make hearing examiners (now ALJs) 'a special class of semi-
independent subordinate hearing officers' by vesting control of their 
compensation, promotion and tenure in the Civil Service 
Commission (now the Office of Personnel Management) to a much 
greater extent than in the case of other Federal employees." 
[Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 US 931 
(1953)].  The agencies employing them do not have the authority to 
withhold the powers vested in Federal ALJs by the APA 
Prior to the enactment of the APA, the tenure and status of these 
hearing examiners were governed by the Classification Act of 1923, 
as amended.  Under that Act, the classification of the hearing 
examiners was determined by ratings given to them by the Agency 
and their compensation and promotion depended upon their 
classification.  This placed the hearing examiners in a dependent 
status with the Agency employing them.  Many complaints were 
voiced against this system alleging that hearing examiners were 
"mere tools of the Agency" and thus subservient to Agency heads 
when they decided and issued decisions on issues involving Agency 
determinations appealed to them.  With the adoption of the APA, 
Congress intended to correct these problems.  As earlier noted, this 
rather significant reform was undertaken to protect the American 
public by giving ALJs decisional independence.  Indeed, the Act's 
legislative history makes abundantly plain that the APA was intended 
to be broad sweeping legislation designed to restore to American 
government fundamental freedoms for the American people, 
freedoms which had become clouded in the murky waters of 
unregulated administrative organizations that were not contemplated 
by the nations' founders, and whose conduct in the realms of 
investigation, prosecution and adjudication had become so 
burdensome as to all but undo what was thought preserved in the 
Constitution.  The widespread concern regarding the absence of an 
independent federal administrative judiciary to hear and decide 
 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 33-1 
 
38 
complex administrative issues was underscored by the President's 
Committee on Administrative Management in 1937.2 
While the APA codified, inter alia, decisional independence of 
ALJs, it is not inconsistent with the Social Security Act.  Thus in 
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420 (1971) the Court 
found that the Social Security Act conforms with and is consistent 
with the APA.  Specifically, the Court found that the APA provisions 
do not differ from nor supersede the authority given ''the Secretary . . 
. by section 205(a) and (b) to establish procedures."  The broad sweep 
of the APA must not be minimized.  The APA extends its reach to 
agency rulemaking and adjudications.  No court has found that the 
Social Security Act stands apart from the APA.  To the contrary, 
many courts have found that the two statues stand in pari material—
to be considered together. 
The APA was enacted to ensure that the American people were 
protected from arbitrary decision making by government bureaucrats.  
The grant of decisional independence to federal administrative law 
judges is fundamental to the ability of the ALJ to bring justice to the 
American people.  When federal agencies overreach and encroach on 
our decisional independence, the promise of Constitutional due 
process to the American people is broken.  In our view, there is 
absolutely no tension between the Social Security Act and the APA.  
The tension that does exist at SSA has arisen ONLY when 
unenlightened bureaucrats unlawfully interfere with the duties and 
responsibilities of the ALJ.  The fact that the APA provides some 
degree of protection to members of the federal administrative 
judiciary should not be viewed as a negative.  Indeed, the minimal 
employment protection offered by the APA is absolutely essential to 
due process and the ability of the judge to correctly adjudicate cases 
filed pursuant to the Social Security Act. 
                                                          
2 The Committee observes of the so-called 'fourth branch' of government, the 
administrative agencies: "They are vested with duties of administration . . . and at 
the same time they are given important judicial work . . . The evils resulting from 
this confusion of principles are insidious and far-reaching Pressures and influences 
properly enough directed toward officers responsible for formulating and 
administering policy constitute an unwholesome atmosphere in which to adjudicate 
private rights.  But the mixed duties of the commissions render escape from these 
subversive influences impossible.  Furthermore, the same men are obliged to serve 
both as prosecutors and as judges.  This not only undermines judicial fairness; it 
weakens public confidence in that fairness." 
    
Spring 2013         Justice and Due Process for the American People 39 
HIGH VOLUME ADJUDICATIONS 
 
Federal ALJs at SSA work in a stressful, high volume 
adjudicatory environment.  In recent years, the Agency has placed far 
too much emphasis on numerical performance rather than on correct 
judicial decision making.  According to Agency officials, Judges 
should spend no more than 2 ½ hours on each case.  At the same 
time, hearing office staff attorneys are allotted 8 hours to prepare a 
draft denial decision for the judge's review. 
To be sure, federal ALJs with conditional lifetime appointments 
and decisional independence are essential to ensure that the 
American people, who file approximately 700,000 to 800,000 cases 
each year, will be provided full and fair due process hearings.  In this 
context, due process and justice can only be accomplished if the 
judge has sufficient time to develop and review each case, provide a 
thorough hearing, deliberate and decide the case and issue a well-
reasoned decision which is fully consistent with the facts of the case 
and the relevant law.  While numerical goals are useful tools, these 
goals must not be used as quotas, as to do so would likely deny due 
process to the claimant and impair the judge's ability to bring justice 
to the American people.  The current production line mentality robs 
the judge of one of the most important elements of due 
process...time.  Time is necessary for ALJs to develop and review the 
evidence, conduct a full and fair hearing, deliberate, and prepare and 
issue a correct decision.  Again, goals are important; quotas run 
contrary to the Social Security Act, the Administrative Procedure Act 
and the U.S. Constitution.  In addition, and most detrimental to the 
American people, is the Agency's application of constant pressure on 
judges to continue to increase the number of cases they adjudicate.  
The pressure of quotas is forcing judges to hear cases before they are 
prepared to do so.  This impairs the judge's ability to adequately and 
thoroughly adjudicate cases.  While some judges may be forced to 
hear and decide a higher volume of cases, higher producing judges 
tend to pay a higher percentage of claims. 
 
As one Hearing Office Chief Judge pointed out, "If 
goals are too high the corners get cut and the easiest 
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thing to do is to grant a case."3 
 
While it may be true that over 75 percent of judges are meeting 
the goal-quota of 500-700 decisions annually, what is not present in 
the data is the fact that most of those judges would appear before you 
and tell you that in order to meet this level of production, they simply 
cannot adequately review all of the evidence in the cases they decide.  
In our view, the current misplaced emphasis on numbers has 
perverted our system of justice.  At an estimated value of $300,000 
per case, the AALJ believes the American people are entitled to have 
a judge who is given adequate time to develop and review all of the 
evidence in each case, conduct a thorough hearing and issue a correct 
decision. 
As you know, SSA ALJs have adjudicated cases at record levels 
in each of the past ten years.  However, the AALJ believes the SSA 
adjudicatory system could be made more efficient, effective and 
economical with changes and modifications that will improve the 
process.  On many prior occasions, the AALJ has urged consideration 
by the Agency of significant changes to the disability adjudication 
system. 
 
GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION 
 
When sued, insurance companies proceed to trial represented by 
the best law firms in the nation.  When a claim is filed for disability 
benefits, the government (SSA) proceeds to trial without legal 
representation.  When an ALJ rules against a claimant in a disability 
case, the claimant can (and usually does) file an appeal with the 
Appeals Council.  When an ALJ rules against the government in a 
disability case creating a $300,000 liability, the government does not 
have a right of appeal.  There is clearly something wrong with this 
picture.  In the context of disability adjudication, the government is 
the trustee of billions of taxpayer dollars.  In our view, it is 
irresponsible to place these funds at risk at hearing without legal 
representation. 
The AALJ has advocated for well over a decade that the SSA be 
                                                          
3 See statement of the Hon.   Patrick O'Carroll, Inspector General, SSA, before 
the Subcommittee on Social Security of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 
September 16,2008, p.  5.   
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represented at administrative hearings by attorneys.  This 
representation should be provided by attorneys from the Office of 
General Counsel, with authority to advocate the American people's 
interest and with the authority to compromise, settle, and appeal 
cases which the government believes were erroneously decided.  The 
cost of such representation could easily be funded by resources saved 
by eliminating or restructuring the Regional Offices of the Office of 
Disability Adjudication and Review (ODAR). 
The Social Security Advisory Board (SSAB) has called for the 
government to be represented as well.  In its 2001 report, the SSAB 
made the following statement: 
 
[T]he fact that most claimants are now represented by 
an attorney reinforces the proposition, which has been 
made several times in the past, that the agency should 
be represented as well.  Unlike a traditional court 
setting, only one side is now represented at Social 
Security's ALJ hearings.  We think that having an 
individual present at the hearing to defend the 
agency's position would help to clarify the issues and 
introduce greater consistency and accountability into 
the adjudicative system.  It would also help to carry 
out an effective cross-examination of the claimant.  
Many ALJs have told us that they are sometimes 
reluctant to conduct the kind of cross-examination 
they believe should be made because, upon appeal, the 
record may make them appear to have been biased 
against the claimant.  Consideration should also be 
given to allowing the individual who represents the 
agency at the hearing to file an appeal of the ALJ 
decision. 
 
This issue has not escaped the analysis of academic commentators.  
Two professors made the following caustic observation in the 
Journal of Economic Perspectives (Volume 20, Number 3, Summer 
2006, pages 71-96 at page 93): 
 
A second promising step would be for the Social 
Security Administration to consider attorney 
representation at Administrative Law Judge hearings, 
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as the independent Social Security Advisory Board 
(2001) has repeatedly recommended [emphasis 
added].  At present, claimants are typically 
represented at appeal by legal and medical advocates 
who have a financial stake in the claimant 's success.  
The Social Security Administration, by contrast, is 
entirely dependent on the Administrative Law Judge 
to protect the claimant's and the public's interests 
simultaneously (U.S. GAO, 1997).  Permitting the 
Social Security Administration to provide a 
representative or attorney to the hearings would 
ameliorate this almost comically lopsided setting 
[emphasis added] in which the Social Security 
Administration currently loses nearly three-quarters of 
all appeals. 
 
The overriding purpose of the hearing is "fact-finding."  The 
AALJ believes that the model used by SSA to conduct hearings is a 
relatively poor fact-finding model as compared to the adversarial 
model.  We believe that the center of any change at SSA should 
include, at a minimum, conversion from the inquisitorial model to the 
adversarial model.  The adversarial system of adjudication is 
fundamental to our American judicial system.  The AALJ knows of 
no state or Federal court that uses the inquisitorial model to 
adjudicate issues.  SSA uses a model unheard of throughout our land 
to find facts in a judicial-type setting. 
 
THE BURDEN OF WEARING 3 HATS 
 
Federal ALJs who hear and decide cases at SSA have an 
unusually complex job.  As a fact-finding system, it is difficult for 
one person to perform all three functions imposed on ALJs: to 
represent the interest of the claimant; to represent the interest of the 
Trust Fund; and to serve as an impartial decision maker (''three 
hats").  To function and appear as an unbiased fact-finder and at the 
same time to examine a claimant vigorously and thoroughly, as one 
would expect a lawyer defending the trust fund to do, is not possible.  
In fact, having the judge defend the Trust Fund as well as the 
claimant's interest, places the judge in an untenable situation.  
Oftentimes vigorous examination of the claimant by the judge leads 
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to allegations against the judge of bias and prejudice.  Some judges 
have even been subjected to discipline by the Agency because of 
aggressive examination of the claimant, done in pursuit of truth and 
justice. 
The benefit of having a lawyer representing the government with 
the authority to settle cases should not be minimized.  In fact, this 
benefit may be even greater to the administration of justice than the 
government's role as an advocate.  One of the factors contributing to 
SSA's high volume jurisdiction is the fact that the vast majority of 
cases are tried.  However, nowhere else in our judicial system is a 
judge required to take to hearing such a high percentage of cases 
compared to the total docket.  Were the state and Federal courts 
required to actually conduct trials in the same proportion as disability 
judges are forced to do with their dockets, those courts would 
abruptly crash under the weight of trying virtually all of their 
dockets.  Having a lawyer with authority to negotiate and settle cases 
has the potential to drastically reduce the number of cases that are 
tried, and conceivably reduce the number of judges and support staff. 
Having government representation would also ensure that the 
evidentiary file is complete and that all necessary development has 
been conducted prior to the hearing.  This would permit the judge to 
become fully informed about the nature and extent of the claimant's 
alleged impairments prior to the hearing.  This type of prehearing 
preparation is necessary for the judge to understand complex medical 
evidence and to evaluate the facts, as found at hearing, in the context 
of relevant law and agency regulations. 
The AALJ believes an adversarial model would far better serve 
the claimants' and the public's interests by being a better fact-finding 
system and by more efficiently disposing of cases through 
compromise and settlement.  With a lawyer representing the 
government, the government can then decide which cases to defend.  
Instead of hearing 90% of the cases (assuming 10% are awarded on 
the record without a hearing), far fewer cases would go to hearing 
because of the ability to settle the case without a hearing.  This 
process would also serve to drive down the backlog quickly. 
Another efficiency, which should accrue to having government 
representation, lies in the shepherding of cases through the appeals 
process.  Identifying those claims that are likely to prevail before the 
judge and agreeing with the claimant's position to enter a favorable 
award, means one fewer case that has to be scheduled and tried.  The 
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government lawyer can then focus resources on defending those 
cases which ought to be defended, rather than spend time on 
perfunctory hearings. 
As above noted, the pressure on judges to produce an ever 
increasing number of cases has reached intolerable levels.  In 
evaluating our concerns, it is essential that members of the 
Subcommittee understand the role of staff in the disability claims 
process.  When case files arrive in a hearing office, they must be 
"worked up" or "pulled," that is, electronically organized for use in 
the hearing.  This is a significant task, which if done properly, 
requires skill and one to three hours of time, as the contents of a 
given file arrive in the hearing office in random sequence, 
unidentified, without pagination, with duplications and without any 
numbered exhibits or table of contents to locate the exhibits.  A staff 
member must identify and eliminate duplicate exhibits from the same 
source, label the remaining exhibits, arrange the exhibits in 
chronological order, number and paginate the exhibits and prepare 
the list of exhibits.  After a case is worked up, it is ready for the 
assigned judge to review. 
In this process, the AALJ believes it important for members of 
the subcommittees to consider how much time ALJs should be 
spending on each disability case.  At an estimated value of $300,000 
per case, we respectfully suggest that this is not a rhetorical question.  
A judge must invest sufficient time to understand all of the facts in 
each case as well as applicable law and regulations.  It is imperative 
for the judge to review all evidence in the file, averaging 600 pages, 
and then direct staff to obtain any missing evidence including 
consultative medical examinations.  When the record is fully 
developed, the judge determines if a hearing is needed or whether a 
favorable decision can be made on the evidence of record, without a 
hearing.  In most cases, a hearing is required and the judge then 
determines which expert witnesses will be required for the hearing 
and if additional courtroom security is necessary.  After this review, 
the staff secures the expert witnesses and schedules the case for 
hearing.  Once the hearing is scheduled, the judge continues to be 
involved with the case reviewing newly submitted evidence and 
considering and resolving pre-hearing motions and issues.  Typically, 
a day or two before the hearing, the judge will conduct another 
review of the file to evaluate additional evidence and to insure 
familiarity with the facts and issues for the hearing.  Many times, last 
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minute evidence is submitted at the hearing which unnecessarily 
delays or otherwise impedes the adjudication of the case.  When the 
hearing is concluded, the judge must deliberate, prepare thorough 
decisional instructions for the writing staff and later review and edit 
the draft decision before signing it.  Sometimes, additional evidence 
is submitted after the hearing, or even after the decision has been 
drafted but not yet signed by the judge, causing the expenditure of 
additional judge time.  As can be gleaned from this brief overview, 
the disability adjudicatory process is complex and time consuming. 
As earlier noted, in courts and other agencies, trials and 
adjudications are conducted under the adversarial process in which 
the case is developed during trial by evidence introduced by opposing 
counsel.  The judge studies and reviews the evidence as the trial 
progresses.  However, in Social Security disability hearings, ALJs 
preside over an inquisitorial process, in which the judge develops the 
facts and the arguments both for and against granting benefits.  In 
large part, this is required because the SSA is not represented at the 
hearing and the courts are sympathetic to unrepresented claimants.  
Therefore, ALJs are required to wear the so-called three hats as 
referenced above.  After reviewing the record evidence, the judge 
often determines that additional evidence must be obtained.  This 
inquisitorial system places more responsibility on the judge.  
Hearings based on this model are more time consuming and labor 
intensive for the judge. 
Certainly, there is variance in the number of decisions issued by 
each judge.  Such a distribution is normal in all human activities, and 
is usually graphed as a "bell curve."  However, the number of 
decisions issued by a judge is dependent on numerous factors such as 
adequate and well trained staffing, the complexity of the cases, the 
number of unrepresented claimants and the sophistication of the bar.  
These are factors clearly beyond the control of the judges. 
Quite compelling is data from SSA's last study on the issue of 
numerical goals for ALJs, Plan for a New Disability Claim Process.  
This study was conducted in 1994 and projected a time line for a 
disability claim at all levels of the process.  The study, based on an 
average month, concluded that a reasonable disposition rate for an 
ALJ should be in the range of 25 to 55 cases per month.  The study 
also revealed that a judge would spend a range of 3 to 7 hours 
adjudicating each case.  Consistent with this study is the following 
testimony of former SSA Chief ALJ Frank Cristaudo before the 
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House Ways and Means Committee, Subcommittee on Social 
Security, on September 6, 2008, in response to questions from 
Congressman Xavier Becerra: 
 
Mr. Becerra.  Do me a favor.  I am going to run out of 
5 minutes real quickly.  I am just asking, do you 
believe that they [ALJs] can get to upwards of 600 to 
700 dispositions on an annual basis? 
 
Judge Cristaudo.  Well, what we are asking the judges 
to try to do-we haven't mandated, we are asking-is to 
get to 500.  The 700 was more of an indication to this 
other group that are doing thousands of cases that at 
some point there may be a limit as to how many cases 
a Judge can actually do and still do quality work.  That 
is what the 700 was about. 
 
There have been changes in the process since 1994, but most of 
those serve to slow down, not speed up, the process.  The average file 
size grows every year.  Reviewing electronic files (eFiles) takes more 
time than reviewing paper files.  Even electronic signing (eSigning) 
of decisions takes longer than using a pen.  While technology may 
have reduced the Agency's overall processing time for claims, it has 
not reduced the amount of time most judges must spend in 
adjudicating a case. 
In considering numerical performance, it is important to 
understand that a judge must carefully review the voluminous 
documentary evidence in the claimant's file to effectively prepare and 
conduct the hearing and to issue a correct decision.  With an average 
estimated cost to the trust fund of $300,000 per case, a judge hearing 
40 cases per month is entrusted to correctly decide cases valued at 
$10,000,000 per month, or $120,000,000 annually.  Nonetheless, 
judges are being subjected to various pressures to meet ever-
increasing production "goals" which in many cases become de facto 
quotas in violation of the APA and infringes on the constitutional 
requirement for ALJs to provide a full and fair due process hearing. 
As a result of SSA's pressure to meet or exceed goals-quotas, 
many judges are forced to give cases less thorough reviews; adequate 
evidentiary development may not be undertaken; facts may go 
unseen; and incorrect assessments may be reached.  In some offices, 
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judges are being pressured to accept un-worked cases that have not 
been organized by staff which is inconsistent with the APA 
requirement that hearings be held with an identifiable record.  The 
judge must waste substantial time in reviewing un-worked files that 
may have many duplicate records, records out of sequence and 
exhibits which are neither identified nor paginated.  This lost time 
should be, instead, spent on reviewing, hearing and deciding more 
cases. 
Reviewing a 600 page case file is not unlike reading a 600-page 
novel.  In both instances, one must read carefully in order to 
understand the story being presented.  Skipping pages in either 
distorts one's understanding of the whole story.  If a judge skips 
evidentiary pages in a case file, the judge could make incorrect 
decisions in that case, harming either the claimant or costing the 
American taxpayers $300,000 for the incorrect decision.  Selectively 
reviewing evidence is a short cut that must cease; otherwise fairness 
and justice disappear from our adjudicatory system. 
 
PEER REVIEW 
 
The AALJ has advocated for an ALJ Peer Review Program at 
SSA for approximately twenty years.  The AALJ believes that such a 
system would efficiently and effectively address ALJ performance 
and conduct issues in a manner that would be beneficial to the 
Agency, the Judge and the American people.  Instead, the Agency 
continues to address these issues in a manner that always leads to 
costly and time consuming litigation.  The Agency has not only 
consistently opposed the establishment of a Peer Review Program but 
also any similar program.  This past year, the AALJ proposed a joint 
workgroup to study and evaluate establishing an ALJ Peer Review 
Program.  The Agency strongly opposed the creation of such a work 
group. 
 
ADJUDICATORY TRANSPARENCY 
 
In our democratic form of government, the need for transparency 
in federal administrative hearings is essential.  Conducting hearings 
in secret fosters suspicion and creates misunderstandings about our 
system of justice.  To build and maintain trust in our adjudicatory 
system by the American people, we must conduct our hearings in the 
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light of day.  The AALJ has long advocated that hearings be open to 
the public.  We believe there is a substantial public interest in how 
disability adjudication is conducted.  We believe that the public's 
interest is generally paramount to a claimant's interest in keeping the 
hearing closed to the public.  Open hearings would lend transparency 
to our administrative adjudication system and instill confidence 
regarding our disability system of justice.  Moreover, should the case 
be appealed to the Federal courts, the entire record is open to the 
public.  Also, we believe the Notice of Hearing should include all 
relevant information, not only the issues to be heard, but also other 
information such as the time, date and place of the hearing and the 
name of the assigned judge. 
 
ARE THE MEDICAL VOCATIONAL GUIDELINES RELEVANT TODAY 
 
For many reasons, Americans are living longer and healthier 
lives.  The nature and scope of work performed by the American 
people is significantly different than 40 years ago.  There are far 
fewer unskilled jobs in the market place and few jobs that require 
significant physical activity.  As a result, application of the Agency's 
Medical Vocational Guidelines (grid rules) oftentimes forces the ALJ 
to award benefits when jobs are available that claimants could 
perform.  In our view, this approach to evaluating disability is out of 
date and should be eliminated.  Rather than using these outdated 
guidelines, judges should rely on vocational testimony.  At a 
minimum, the grid rules should be revised to reflect the increased life 
span of Americans. 
 
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND CLOSING THE RECORD 
 
The AALJ has advocated for the adoption of procedural rules, 
however, the Agency has consistently refused to do so.  No other 
judicial system functions without rules of procedure.  Further, no 
other judicial system operates by permitting the record to remain 
open continuously throughout the adjudicatory and appellate process.  
For example, medical evidence could be withheld from the ALJ and 
later submitted to the Appeals Council in order to secure a remand of 
the case and another hearing.  There is no incentive under the current 
system to submit evidence in a timely fashion. 
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Procedural rules would ensure an efficient, effective and orderly 
judicial system.  Like a road map, procedural rules would aid 
litigants by giving specific guidance on how to navigate the 
adjudicatory process.  At SSA such rules could cover, inter alia, 
submission of evidence, dismissals, prehearing conferences, 
subpoenas, oral argument, representatives' responsibilities, ex parte 
communications, continuances and prehearing development. 
Perhaps one of the most important areas ripe for procedural rules 
is closing the record.  The AALJ has long advocated that the record 
should be closed at the conclusion of the hearing unless the ALJ 
directs otherwise.  Any post hearing evidence submitted to the ALJ 
prior to the issuance of a decision would be admitted into the record 
upon a showing that such evidence is material and could not have 
been submitted prior to the close of hearing.  If a party waives a 
hearing, the record would be closed on the date the decision is issued. 
 
THE VALUE OF MEDICAL EXPERT WITNESSES 
 
Medical expert witnesses serve an important role in the 
adjudicatory process in that their testimony assists the ALJ in 
reaching the correct decision in a given case.  Presently, the Agency 
has a dearth of medical expert witnesses because their pay has not 
increased in more than a decade.  Pay rates need to rise, and the SSA 
needs to develop a national pool of medical specialists who can 
appear at hearings by way of video.  In most cases, courts are more 
likely to uphold a decision if a knowledgeable medical expert witness 
testifies at a disability hearing.  The cost for using a medical expert 
witness is less than the cost of holding another hearing if the case is 
remanded as a result of the lack of medical expert testimony. 
 
REDIRECTED RESOURCES TO REDUCE THE BACKLOG 
 
The SSA expends a great deal of money on maintaining ten 
Regional Offices within ODAR.  Since ODAR Regional Offices do 
not directly contribute to the processing and adjudication of cases, as 
they handle few, if any, cases, Regional Offices are merely another 
layer of bureaucratic administration that deprives ODAR hearing 
offices of personnel.  Over the last fifteen years, the Regional Offices 
have added substantial staff, which could have been better deployed 
in the hearing offices.  The AALJ advocates the elimination of the 
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ODAR Regional Offices and the reassignment of Regional Office 
staff to hearing offices to handle the backlog, with the savings from 
office rental costs being redirected to the hearing offices.  The overall 
responsibility for the disability adjudication system, including current 
Regional functions, should be consolidated in the Office of the Chief 
Administrative Law Judge and under the management of the Chief 
Administrative Law Judge. 
 
VIDEO HEARINGS 
 
Face to face hearings provide the best method of delivering due 
process to the American people.  While there may be some instances 
where video hearings are advisable (such as handling cases in remote 
areas that would require excessive travel), widespread use of the 
National Hearing Centers (NHCs) reduces the ability of the SSA to 
provide due process to the American people.  Video hearings should 
be kept to a minimum in order to preserve the right of every 
American to have the opportunity to make their case in person to the 
Judge.  No claimant should be induced into submitting to a video 
hearing by the Agency's promise of a much earlier hearing date.  No 
video hearing can provide the same experience and the same contact 
between a claimant and Judge as an in-person hearing.  Moreover, 
video hearings require the use of a second courtroom; one for the 
judge and one for the claimant who appears at the hearing by video.  
This requirement for additional space imposes significant additional 
costs for the American taxpayer. 
 
INDEPENDENT CORPS NEEDED 
 
Critically important to any successful democracy is an 
independent judicial system.  At the SSA, ALJs do not have the 
independence envisioned by the APA, the Social Security Act, or 
the United States Constitution.  Agency officials are now imposing 
daily, weekly, monthly and yearly production quotas.  The 
imposition of these quotas, often euphemistically referred to as 
goals, has had a deleterious impact on case adjudication.  Placing 
disability judges in an organization separate from SSA would 
better ensure justice for the American people. 
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For two decades, the disability adjudication at SSA has 
suffered from numerous failed management initiatives.  With the 
exception of changes undertaken by former Commissioner Joanne 
Barnhart, all other initiatives were established and implemented by 
the Agency without the involvement of the AALJ, whose members 
are the most knowledgeable about disability adjudication.  It is no 
surprise that those initiatives failed, with great cost to the American 
people. 
The establishment of an independent corps of disability judges 
would better serve the public than the current system which has a 
long history of failures. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Social Security Program is absolutely vital to the American 
people.  Our judges are working extremely hard to address the 
backlog of cases under very adverse circumstances.  We are most 
hopeful that you will further pursue the issues we raise to ensure that 
claimants receive a full and fair due process hearing by 
administrative law judges and, at the same time, that the American 
public receives justice. 
Thank you for the opportunity to submit this statement and to 
present our views on these important issues. 
 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
D. Randall Frye 
President, AALJ 
